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The Unconstitutionality of Long-Term
Nuclear Pacts that are Rejected by Over
One-Third of the Senate
ANDREW T. HYMAN*
In recent years, some Americans have invented the doctrine that
treaties and executive agreements are wholly interchangeable ....
The Committee on the Judiciary cannot agree that the President
acting alone, or the Congress and the President acting together,
should bypass the treaty procedure whenever the approval of two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting appears doubtful. The
treaty clause is an integral part of the Constitution, which both
Senators and Representatives have taken an oath to protect and
defend.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution confers on the President the "Pow-
er, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Trea-
ties, provided two thirds of the Senators present Concur."2 Some schol-
ars have suggested that the President and Congress can circumvent
this clause requiring a two-thirds Senate majority vote simply by label-
ing all international accords "agreements" instead of "treaties."3 Not-
* J.D., Lewis and Clark's Northwestern School of Law (1994). This article
benefitted greatly from the advice of Law Professor Daniel J. Rohlf. Thanks also go
to Mr. Randy Rydell of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Mr. Steve
Dolley of the Nuclear Control Institute, Mr. Eldon Greenberg of Garvey, Schubert &
Barer, Law Professors Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bruce Ackerman, and William Funk,
Ms. Claire Reade of the American Bar Association, Mr. J. David Yeager, Mr. Mark
Lear, and my family. These people do not necessarily, however, share all the views
herein expressed.
1. S. REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956) (this report was submitted
by Senator Dirksen on behalf of the Judiciary Committee). As indicated by the text
accompanying this note, the report took issue with those who say that the Consti-
tution allows for complete interchangeability of treaties and executive agreements.
The main theme of this report, though, was that the Constitution should be amend-
ed to explicitly ban accords inconsistent with the Constitution.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. See generally Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.
J. 181, 261 (1945). The views of McDougal and Lans are in marked contrast to the
pre-1940 consensus. See generally Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the
Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 751, 755 (1939) (Assistant Secretary of
State Sayre distinguished between treaties on the one hand and executive agree-
ments covering adjustments of detail or temporary arrangements on the other hand).
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withstanding this fashionable doctrine of complete interchangeability,
and despite the haziness of the line separating treaties from agree-
ments, many major accords necessarily fall within the meaning of the
word "treaty" as used in Article II of the Constitution, just as many
routine or short-term accords obviously need not be Article II treaties.
In 1987, President Reagan presented to Congress a proposed nu-
clear cooperation "agreement" with Japan.' More than one-third of the
Senate voted in opposition to the pact.5 Nevertheless, this U.S.-Japan
Pact was enforced, in violation of the Article II treaty clause which had
prevailed since 1787.
According to its terms, the U.S.-Japan Pact is ordinarily irrevoca-
ble and "shall remain in force for a period of thirty years."' During
this time the United States and Japan are supposed to cooperate in
the production of huge quantities of weapons-usable plutonium, for use
in the world's first commercial-size breeder reactors outside of Russia.
President Clinton sees merit in a worldwide ban on plutonium produc-
tion, but the U.S.-Japan Pact is impeding U.S. support for such a
ban.7 Meanwhile, the European nuclear agency (EURATOM) is re-
questing the same unprecedented long-term concessions that the Unit-
ed States was willing to make to Japan,8 with negotiations currently
in process.
The remainder of this article will not address the merits of wheth-
er accords like the U.S-Japan Pact warrant support, or whether advo-
cates of a worldwide ban on plutonium production have the better
Also see generally Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty,
53 YALE L. J. 664 (1944) (arguing against the notion of complete interchangeability
of treaties and executive agreements).
4. H.R. Doc. No. 128, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987). This agreement was
transmitted to Congress pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 123(d), 42
U.S.C. § 2153(d) (1988), and it remains in force to this day. See Agreement for Co-
operation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Ja-
pan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Nov. 4, 1987, U.S.-Japan, Hein's
No. KAV 1050. The State Department contends that the pact is valid because of
"the critical fact" that the Executive Branch complied with all relevant acts of Con-
gress. Letter from Fred McGoldrick, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear
Energy Affairs, U.S. State Department, to Andrew Hyman (July 26, 1994) (on file
with author). Nonetheless, compliance with acts of Congress does not free the Exec-
utive from complementary constitutional strictures.
5. 134 CONG. REC. 4558 (1988). Of 83 Senators present, 30 voted against the
pact.
6. H.R. DOC. No. 128, supra note 4, at 19.
7. See, e.g., Thomas W. Lippman, infra note 118 and accompanying text.
Throughout this article, "plutonium production" refers to the extraction and purifica-
tion process known technically as "plutonium reprocessing." The other process for
making bomb-usable material is called " high enrichment of uranium," and neither
process is necessary to operate normal nuclear plants.
8. Fred McGoldrick, Problems of Assurance of Nuclear Supplies, Address Before
the Atomic Industrial Forum (May 27, 1987), in DEP'T ST. BULL. Sept. 1987, at 48.
VOL. 23:2
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LONG-TERM PACTS
arguments.9 The crucial legal issue is whether President Clinton may
enforce a major long-term accord such as the U.S.-Japan Pact, which
limits the suspension rights of the United States, notwithstanding the
manifest inability to obtain two-thirds Senate approval. This article
will demonstrate that the President may not blatantly violate the
Constitution's Article II treaty provisions by enforcing such an accord,
and that the U.S.-Japan Pact is the only such violation in United
States history. The Pact will continue to be unlawful as long as the
President refuses to seek the requisite concurrence of the Senate.
II. BACKGROUND
The requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote was designed to
ensure that strong national consensus exists before the United States
commits itself to a course that involves the American people in activi-
ties beyond their sovereign control. Some scholars believe that the
treaty process anachronistically excludes the House of Representa-
tives,' but the President can negotiate treaties which, by their terms,
are conditioned upon House approval." It is also sometimes argued
that the treaty process necessarily leads to protectionism and isolation-
ism. However, few treaties have been derailed by the Senate, the most
noteworthy one being the Treaty of Versailles negotiated by President
Wilson. 2 History shows that the primary effect of the two-thirds re-
quirement has been that treaties "are by necessity truly national and
not merely partisan ... The two-thirds rule has often colored negotia-
tions, since those who make treaties have to be aware, as Wilson really
9. See, e.g., Time to Ban Plutonium Production, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 1993, at
18.
10. See, e.g., LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1972).
11. This has often been the case; on one occasion the House even went so far as
to kill a treaty which two-thirds of the Senate had approved (a trade treaty with
Mexico was signed in 1883, the Senate approved it by a two-thirds vote, but the
House refused to go along). See generally V. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (1906). Even when House approval is not required by a
treaty, it is often necessary in order to implement its terms (though the House then
has a strong moral duty to make good on the country's promise).
12. ROYDEN J. DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE 310 (1933). According
to Dangerfield, 787 treaties were formally considered by the Senate from 1788 to
1928, and only seven of them were defeated by a minority of Senators. Id. at 312.
The only memorable one of those seven treaties, the Treaty of Versailles, established
the League of Nations at the end of World War I. When that treaty was before the
Senate, a majority of Senators decided to add several reservations to it, and those
reservations caused President Wilson to oppose final Senate approval. It is well-
known that Wilson's opposition doomed the treaty, which lost by a vote of 49 Sena-
tors in favor of ratification to 35 against. 19 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
839 (1983). Wilson "made the serious error of not including any Republicans or any
senators from either party in his delegation" to the Paris Peace Conference. HARRY
S. TRUMAN, WHERE THE BUCK STOPS 359 (Margaret Truman ed., 1989). (Wilson was
also "intransigent and childish" in responding to the Senate's complaints about the
treaty.)
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was not, of the danger of losing the needed support."3
Proponents of circumventing the treaty process contend that the
President always has complete discretion to negotiate an executive
agreement instead of a treaty, and that congressional authorization or
approval may (in the case of "congressional-executive agreements") or
may not (in the case of "sole-executive agreements") be required. 4
This ill-conceived theory is of recent date, and thus has not yet been
addressed by the courts. This article will not explore in detail the pros-
pects for judicial review; suffice it to say that the courts have been
willing to deal with similar issues."
As will be shown below, any significant long-term international
13. 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
68 (Warren I. Cohen ed., 1993). See also Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional
Power of the United States Senate to Condition its Consent to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 533, 570 (1991). As Glennon states:
The requirement of two-thirds Senate approval is directed at ensuring
that significant international commitments undertaken by the United
States have the overwhelming support of the American people. We have
learned, to our sorrow, that when significant national commitments are
made without the support of the people, the results can be tragic and
costly, in systematic legitimacy as well as human life.
14. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 3. There are various ways in which the
President can bring an international accord into force. See generally Jack S. Weiss,
Comment, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1991). In addition to the options listed by
Weiss, the President can negotiate a treaty explicitly requiring House approval. V.
MOORE, supra note 11, at 222.
15. Often the validity of international accords has been challenged by private
plaintiffs, and several such cases are addressed below. Legislators too have some-
times litigated the validity of international accords. For instance, in Goldwater v.
Carter, 144 U.S. 996 (1979), the President and Senator Goldwater were at odds over
the President's claim of right to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan ab-
sent Senate approval. The Justices evenly split on whether the case presented a
nonjusticiable "political question," and Justice Powell concurred in the Court's refusal
to address the merits, arguing that the case would not be ripe until "either the
Senate or the House has rejected the President's claim." Id. at 998. As far as the
U.S.-Japan Pact is concerned, over a third of the Senators present did in fact reject
the pact, so the ripeness and political question doctrines do not appear dispositive of
whether the Supreme Court would address the merits. In Edwards v. Carter, House
members sued the President for making a treaty to dispose of the Panama Canal
without House approval, and the courts willingly addressed the merits. 580 F.2d
1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 436 U.S. 907 (1978). In Dole v. Carter, Senator
Dole sued the President for agreeing to return a crown to Hungary absent Senate
consent, and the court found no justiciable controversy because the court was not
aware of any judicially manageable standards for resolving the issue. 569 F.2d 1109,
1110 (10th Cir. 1977). In Cranston v. Reagan, congressional plaintiffs as well as pri-
vate plaintiffs claimed that nuclear pacts with Norway and Sweden violated the
Atomic Energy Act, and the court predictably dismissed the case because neither the
Senate nor the House made an "attempt to pass a concurrent resolution disapprov-
ing either of the Agreements .... despite their statutorily-guaranteed opportunity
to do so." 611 F. Supp. 247, 251-253 (D.C. 1985).
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compact (i.e. one which is significant enough to warrant the
President's personal scrutiny) is necessarily an Article II "treaty,"
whereas other compacts may or may not have to be classified as "trea-
ties." An international compact is not "long-term" if it specifies that
each party can take action to revoke the deal on short notice for any
reason. 16
Unfortunately, the international nuclear policy of the United
States is now controlled by people who have apparently accepted the
"extreme"17 theory that any international pact may be approved as a
congressional-executive agreement. This theory "explicitly contra-
venes"8 and "consciously disregards the intent of the framers." 9 It is
also contrary to Supreme Court precedent, to the accepted usage of the
word "treaty" under the Articles of Confederation, to early commentary
regarding treaties and agreements, and to the past practices of the
political arms of government. In truth, compliance with acts of Con-
gress does not free the Executive from complementary constitutional
limitations on international deal-making.
Part III of this article provides further background about the
current constitutional controversy. Part IV explores the constitutional
16. The United States can revoke any treaty at any time for any reason, regard-
less of what the treaty itself says, because the latest expression of the sovereign will
is controlling. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). However, there is general
agreement that the superseding of a treaty by subsequent act of Congress "does not
relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequence of
violation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §115.1 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
17. Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 1089, 1094-95
(1990).
18. Weiss, supra note 14, at 1559.
19. Id. at 1562. Incidentally, there are variations on this theory, according to
which any pact may be processed as a congressional-executive agreement, if it con-
cerns a topic within the enumerated powers of Congress, regardless of whether the
pact is binding for a considerable time. However, the explicit right to withdraw from
an accord, such as the Uruguay Round of GAIT, Apr. 15, 1994. 33 I.L.M. 1144, is a
major safeguard protecting American sovereignty. The Uruguay Round of GATT was
approved by a Senate vote of 76 to 24 on December 1, 1994. 140 CONG REC. S15379
(1994). See generally The World Trade Organization and the Treaty Clause, Prepared
Statement of Laurence H. Tribe Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, October 18, 1994 [hereinafter Tribe's Statement], reprinted in
GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 285 (1994); Memorandum from
Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School, to various government officials (November
28, 1994) reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. S15077-01(1994). According to the Justice
Department, "[allthough we insist on the variety of legal instruments by which the
United States may make agreements with foreign nations, we do not dispute Profes-
sor Tribe's view that some such agreements may have to be ratified as treaties."
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Ambassador Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative (Novem-
ber 22, 1994) at 4, n. 13 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). See gener-
ally infra note 40.
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principles in greater depth, and dispels any notion that the meaning of
the Constitution's treaty provisions is entirely obscure. ° Part V
brings this constitutional analysis to bear on the U.S.-Japan Pact. Part
VI concludes that long-term nuclear accords are necessarily Article II
treaties, and are thus unconstitutional and ultra vires when rejected
by one-third of the Senate.
III. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY IN BRIEF
Until World War II, even the most ardent opponents of the Article
II treaty process acknowledged its inescapability.2' Today's prevailing
view is quite different. According to the American Law Institute:
Since any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive agree-
ment could also be concluded by treaty ... either method may be
used in many cases. The prevailing view is that the Congressional-
Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance.'
The Reporters' Notes to the Restatement seek to justify the pre-
vailing view, a view which the American Law Institute does not en-
dorse.23 According to Reporters' Note 8, "[s]cholarly opinion has reject-
ed" the idea "that some agreements can be made only as treaties, by
the procedure designated in the Constitution." In fact, however, many
scholars do not agree with the reporters' position,24 and consider the
20. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, S. RPT., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1993). According to the Congressional
Research Service, "the understanding of the Drafters remains largely obscure" and it
remains unclear "whether any subject that is dealt with by treaty may also be ef-
fected by an executive agreement . . . " Id. at 53.
21. For example, Secretary of State John Hay wrote to President McKinley in
1899 that "I see no escape from it, since the Fathers in their wisdom chose to as-
sume that one-third of the Senate in opposition would always be right, and the
President and the majority generally wrong." HENKIN, supra note 10, at 377. Inci-
dentally, Hay had been an aide to President Lincoln, and would later serve as Theo-
dore Roosevelt's Secretary of State.
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303 cmt e.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303, Reporters' Note 8. The Reporter's Notes
reflect the views of the reporters, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
American Law Institute. Id. at xi. According to the American Law Institute, "trea-
ties constitute one category of international agreement that constitutionally requires
a particular process and has a particular status." Id. at 146. This position of the
American Law Institute seems to be at odds with the reporters' notion that the
President, the House, and the Senate are subject to no requirements whatsoever in
deciding what process to use for a given international accord. Incidentally, the Chief
Reporter for the RESTATEMENT is listed as Louis Henkin. Id. at v; see generally
HENKIN, supra note 10.
24. Randall, supra note 17, at 1094-95. Randall writes that "many scholars" ar-
ticulate positions different from the "extreme" view that "congressional-executive
agreements and treaties are entirely interchangeable." Id. Unfortunately, the extreme
view is currently the prevailing view.
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reporters' view "contrary to the intent of the framers." ' Although the
reporters mention as precedent several recent international commit-
ments which purportedly bypassed the Article II treaty process," all
of the commitments cited in Reporters' Note 8 were approved by two-
thirds of the Senators present. There was never any Article II issue
when Senators overwhelmingly supported joint resolutions on the fol-
lowing matters:27 the Bretton Woods Agreement,' membership in
the International Labor Organization,' and the U.N. Headquarters
Agreement.'
25. Weiss, supra note 14, at 1560. To support their thesis in Reporter's notes 8,
the reporters cite an article by McDougal and Lans. See generally supra note 3. The
reporters omit to mention that the Senate Judiciary Committee has rejected the
doctrine of McDougal and Lans. See supra text accompanying note 1. The reporters
also rely upon an opinion of the Attorney General, regarding the United Nations,
but in that opinion the Attorney General specifically declined to consider "whether or
not there are circumstances under which a given international compact must take
the form of a treaty." 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 469, 470 (1946). Furthermore, the reporters
seek to buttress their position with a book by the Chief Reporter, Mr. Henkin, but
in fact Mr. Henkin's book is ambiguous; he writes that "the President can seek
approval of any agreement by joint resolution of both houses of Congress instead of
two-thirds of the Senate only" and at another point Mr. Henkin writes that "[olne is
compelled to conclude that there are agreements which the President can make on
his sole authority and others which he can make only with the consent of the Sen-
ate." HENKIN, supra note 10, at 175, 179.
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303 Reporters' Note 8.
27. There is no reason why treaties need to be designated as such. According to
the RESTATEMENT: "Whatever their designation, all agreements have the same legal
status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion indicate
otherwise." RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 301 com a. By the same token, there is
no reason why treaties cannot be approved by the Senate under the designation of a
joint resolution. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
In Fourteen Diamond Rings, the Supreme Court faced a situation in which two-
thirds of the Senate had formally consented to a treaty with Spain, and Senators
thereafter sought to impose a condition upon this consent, by way of a joint resolu-
tion (the President had not yet put the treaty into operation). The Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Fuller, held that the joint resolution "was adopted by
the Senate by a vote of 26 to 22, not two thirds of a quorum : and that it is abso-
lutely without legal significance on the question before us." Id. at 180. Justice
Brown concurred that, if the Senate had approved the joint resolution by a two-
thirds vote, then the resolution would have been effective as part of the treaty, but
only if the President and the other contracting party consented. Id. at 182. Of
course, the President as well as the other contracting parties did indeed consent to
the International Labor Organization, the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the U.N.
Headquarters Agreement, and those accords can therefore be considered valid Article
II treaties. Although those three accords did not proclaim themselves to be "treaties,"
and the Senate did not refer to them as Article II "treaties," those facts are not
dispositive of whether they were in fact Article II treaties; the Supreme Court has
long held that "[tihe Constitution looked to the essence and substance of things, and
not to mere form." Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573 (1840).
28. The Senate vote was 61 to 16. 91 CONG. REC. 7780 (1945).
29. Passed by unanimous consent in the Senate. 78 CONG. REC. 11343 (1934).
See also 78 CONG. REC. 12238 (1934) (providing more information about the Senate
vote).
30. The Senate gave its final approval to the Headquarters Agreement "without
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International accords such as NAFTA31 and the 1947 GATT ac-
cord32 have also gone into effect without blatantly violating Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution, because such accords never represented
long-term commitments. NAFTA, as well as the 1947 GATT accord,
allow the United States to withdraw upon six months' notice.' In
objection." 93 CONG. REC. 10400 (1947).
31. The North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 1992, Hein's No.
KAV 3417 [hereinafter NAFTA]. The Senate's final vote on NAFTA was 61 in favor
to 38 against the pact, short of the two-thirds that would have been needed for a
treaty. 139 CONG. REC. 16712-13 (1993). Article 2205 of NAFTA specifies that a
party may withdraw from the agreement with six months' written notice. Inciden-
tally, President Clinton negotiated side accords to NAFTA which were not formally
presented to Congress or to the Senate. In discussing those side accords, Senator
Stevens succinctly restated the position that treaties and executive agreements are
not always interchangeable:
Although the President has some discretion to choose the instrument
that he will use to enter into an international agreement, he must re-
spect the confines of the instrument he chooses. I believe the Consti-
tution refers to treaties, to compacts and to agreements as some of the
choices the President has. But, I believe that there are some parameters
on any President in choosing the instrument that he is going to use for
international accords.
139 CONG. REC. 16352 (1993).
32. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A74
(1947) [hereinafter 1947 GATT]. Article XXXI of the 1947 GATT provides that par-
ties can speedily withdraw if they so choose. The 1947 GATT was not submitted to
the Senate, nor was it formally submitted to Congress. John H. Jackson, The Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 249, 253 - 265 (1967). The 1947 GATT has been used to support the notion
that "no consistent pattern supports any substantive common law principle requir-
ing that significant agreements or long-term agreements take the form of Article II
treaties." Weiss, supra note 14, at 1557. This statement is incorrect inasmuch as the
1947 GATT accord cannot properly be regarded, constitutionally, as a long-term
commitment, since it is revocable at will. Of course, even an accord which purports
to allow for revocation at will can represent a long-term commitment, if the accord
sets up a mechanism for actions against signatories who revoke the accord, but the
1947 GATT accord does not contain such a mechanism.
33. This is not to say that such accords could not or should not be dealt with as
treaties; it is often advisable to seek treaty approval of a revocable accord in order
to obtain widespread support, even when there is no legal requirement that the
treaty mechanism be used. Furthermore, even if an accord does not necessarily fall
within the Framers' definition of "treaty" (due to its revocability), it still may require
treaty approval if Congress would otherwise be violating another part of the Consti-
tution. See generally infra note 40. Incidentally, the debate over NAFTA has
spawned an extraordinary onslaught of constitutional argumentation. See Bruce
Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1995). Ackerman and Golove dwell upon the Senate's approval in 1947 of a
trusteeship accord submitted by President Truman. See 93 CONG. REC. 8850 (1947).
That accord passed without noticeable opposition from a single Senator, and there
was not the slightest controversy about its validity. Id. According to Ackerman's and
Golove's line of reasoning: (1) the Senate surrendered its exclusive treaty role during
a four-year period culminating with the 1947 accord, (2) the Senate's failure to chal-
lenge an insignificant remark by President Truman "speaks louder than a formal
amendment" of the Constitution, (3) the law in this area remains where it was left
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stark contrast, long-term pacts like the thirty-year nuclear accord be-
tween the United States and Japan are, by their terms, ordinarily
irrevocable, and they therefore fall squarely into the group of compacts
that are necessarily "treaties" under the Constitution. Thus, long-term
pacts like the U.S.-Japan Pact cannot be valid without implicit or
explicit approval of two-thirds of the Senate.
IV. How TREATIES AND ExEcuTIvE AGREEMENTS DIFFER
To determine the constitutionality of an international accord, the
first place to look is to the words of the Constitution, and to the defini-
tions used by its authors. If the Constitution is ambiguous on its face,
then it may be necessary to seek guidance in similar provisions of prior
laws, most notably the Articles of Confederation. The intended mean-
ing of the Constitution can also be clarified by the early legal commen-
taries written while the Framers were still able to recount their delib-
erations. Furthermore, an examination of case law can produce evi-
dence as to constitutionality, as can an analysis of precedents set
throughout the country's history by the executive and legislative
branches of government. For the sake of thoroughness, all of these
sources are consulted below, although it would be sufficient to study
the words of the Constitution's treaty provisions, which are in many
respects unambiguous.
A. Terms of the Constitution and their Definitions
Article II of the Constitution sets forth a brief rule on the forma-
tion of international treaties.3 4 This rule can always be changed
through the amendment process,3" but until then the rule remains the
in 1947, (4) we now have no authority to displace these judgments, and (5) Presi-
dent Truman codified this constitutional amendment in 1947. See Bruce Ackerman
and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 895, 903, 908,
913, 924 (1995). Despite this attempt to make a mountain out of a molehill, the
1947 trusteeship accord has no precedential value on the question before us, because
over two-thirds of the Senate acquiesced to it. Even if 34% of the Senate had op-
posed the accord, it would still have been valid because, for example, it did not
imply any commitment that the United States would not unilaterally terminate the
accord. See 12 Bevans 951. See generally Francis B. Sayre, Legal Problems Arising
from the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L. & PoLicY 263, 289-
290 (1948) (Sayre, by the way, was President Wilson's son-in-law). President Truman
realized that the treaty clause was carefully designed as a limitation upon presiden-
tial power, and he certainly never codified an amendment of it. See infra note 134.
See generally infra note 40 (Professor Tribe's conclusion with regard to this matter).
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35. George Washington said:
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the
Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by
an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let
there be no changes by usurpation; for though this, in one instance,
may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which
1995
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law of the land in keeping with the clear and ordained intent of the
Framers.36
The Constitution gives the President power to make treaties, if
two-thirds of the Senate concurs. The Framers intended that treaties,
including commercial ones, be dealt with only in this way,37 regard-
free governments are destroyed.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 35 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 214, 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
There have been attempts to amend the Constitution's treaty provisions. For in-
stance, the House Judiciary Committee once proposed an amendment that it felt was
necessary to give Congress power to allow treaties, but that proposal ultimately
failed. H.R. REP. No. 2061, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). The constitutional
amendment process is the only safe way for the people to exercise their virtually
unlimited legal power.
36. Abraham Lincoln said: 'The intention of the lawgiver is the law." Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 133, 135 (1989).
37. Treaties could conceivably be made in other ways, if it were admitted that
the express treaty provisions of the Constitution are not exclusive. For instance, one
could argue that Congress has an implied treaty power, since Article II, Section 2
says the President "shall have power" instead of "shall have the power" to make
treaties. Nevertheless, it is well-established that the treaty power was meant to be
an exclusive power that cannot be exercised without the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate (the approval of the House may or may not also be required). As Presi-
dent Washington stated:
Having been a member of the General Convention, and knowing the
principles on which the Constitution was formed, I have ever enter-
tained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment
of the Government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that
opinion, that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided
two-thirds of the Senators present concur, and that every treaty so
made and promulgated, thenceforward became the Law of the land . . .
George Washington, Letter to the House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796), in 35
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 2, 3-4 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940) (emphasis
added).
The records of the Constitutional Convention confirm the exclusivity of the
treaty power. For example, Mr. Morris argued that Congress would be unwilling to
declare war if two-thirds of the Senate were needed to approve a peace treaty.
JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 685 (E.H. Scott ed., 1893).
Likewise, the Founders realized that commercial treaties "may be so framed as to be
partially injurious" to minorities, and it was in order to provide "security" for minor-
ities that the Founders permitted one-third of the Senate to block commercial trea-
ties. George Mason, Comment on Draft Constitution, in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX
FARRAND's THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 209 (James H.
Hutson ed., 1987). The Constitution does give Congress power to regulate foreign
commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, as Mason observed, the Constitu-
tion qualifies that grant by prohibiting the entry of the United States into commer-
cial treaties which are opposed by one-third of Senators present. The Necessary and
Proper Clause does allow Congress to make "laws" to carry out its powers, but not
"treaties." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 19. Treaty-making power is distinct from law-
making power. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Constitution clearly states where
the treaty-making power resides: with the President and the Senate. U.S. CONST.
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less of whether the treaty relates to peace, military alliance, coopera-
tion, or anything else.' As John Jay wrote,
[tihe power of making treaties is an important one especially as it
relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated
but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the
highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified
for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public
good. 9
The Framers viewed treaties as only one type of transnational
accord. The language of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution in-
cludes: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion" and "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power." Thus, the word "treaty," as used in the Constitution, does not
signify every compact with a foreign country, since otherwise there
would be no way for a state to make an "agreement or compact" with a
foreign power. This suggests that the Framers intended that the na-
tional government also have the ability to enter into compacts distinct
from "treaties,"' while at the same time it is manifestly clear from the
text of the Constitution that not every "treaty" can be characterized as
an "agreement." If that alternative were always available, then the
word "treaty" in Article I, Section 10 would be surplusage."' Although
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38. The language of Article II does not restrict the types of treaties that the
President and Senate can make. Alexander Hamilton observed that the treaty pow-
ers of Great Britain are similarly unrestricted, inasmuch as the King of Great Brit-
ain can "of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every
other description .... The [King] can perform alone what the [President] can only
do with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at
419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). It has long been recognized
that, because the "power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in general
terms, without any description of the objects to be embraced by it," then conse-
quently this power includes "all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse of
nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty." Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 595 (1840) (emphasis added).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
40. Professor Tribe correctly discerns an important constitutional limitation on
international accords, which are ratified by mere congressional majority. They are
presumably valid only insofar as they "could have been accomplished by a combina-
tion of Congressional delegation and the President's inherent power over foreign af-
fairs". Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1223, 1277 (1995). See
generally ROOSEVELT, infra note 49 (Theodore Roosevelt on the limits of executive
power).
41. The Constitution does not explicitly delegate to the President any power to
enter into non-treaty accords. However, the Supreme Court has held that the Tenth
Amendment reservation of nondelegated powers is inapplicable in the realm of for-
eign affairs, because foreign affairs powers had already been delegated by the states
before 1789. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(opinion delivered by Justice Sutherland). The Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright said
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neither the text of the Constitution nor the records of the Convention
explicitly defines the difference between a "treaty" and an "agreement
or compact,"42 the definitions of the Framers have not been perma-
nently lost.
The Supreme Court has observed that "[tihe international jurist
most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution was
Emmerich de Vattel."4' In 1775, Benjamin Franklin declared that
Vattel's The Law of Nations "has been continually in the hands of the
members of our Congress now sitting... " The Supreme Court has
quoted The Law of Nations45 in order to prove how the Framers em-
ployed the word "treaty," as follows:
Vattel, page 192, sec. 152, says: "A treaty, in Latin fcedus, is a
compact made with a view to the public welfare, by the superior
power, either for perpetuity, or for a considerable time." Section
153. "The compacts which have temporary matters for their object,
are called agreements, conventions, and pactions. They are accom-
plished by one single act, and not by repeated acts. These compacts
the "broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution ... is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs." Id. at 315-16. The Court correctly pointed out that
"the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in
the constitutional sense" exists "as inherently inseparable from the conception of
nationality." Id. at 318. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that "there may
be matters . . . that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty fol-
lowed by such an act could." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
42. The Constitution does make it "absolutely clear" that treaties are, by defini-
tion, not completely interchangeable with non-treaties, because the Constitution al-
lows states to make "agreements" or "compacts" with foreign powers (if Congress
assents) while forbidding states to make "treaties" with foreign powers (even if Con-
gress assents). Tribe's Statement, supra note 19, at 4. See also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§10. The Supreme Court long ago concluded that the word "treaty" has the same
basic meaning in Article II, Section 2 as it does in Article I, Section 10. The Court
said in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840): "In speaking of the
treaty-making power . . . [w]hatever is granted to the general government is forbid-
den to the states, because the same word is used to describe the power denied to
the latter, which is employed in describing the power conferred on the former." How-
ever, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the language of Article I ("treaty,
alliance, or confederation") limits the meaning of the word "treaty" according to the
rule of construction noscitur a sociis. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519
(1893). According to this rule, "when two or more words are grouped together, and
ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general
word will be limited and qualified by the special word." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 (1992). Thus, the words "treaty, alli-
ance, or confederation" in Article I are usually understood to include only those
treaties which may encroach upon national authority. The meaning of the word
"treaty" in Article II, though, is not limited by any nearby words.
43. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 462 (1977).
44. Id.
45. 3 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATU-
RAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (this volume consists of an English
translation of the 1758 edition).
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are perfected in their execution once for all; treaties receive a suc-
cessive execution, whose duration equals that of the treaty." Section
154. Public treaties can only be made by the "supreme power, by
sovereigns who contract in the name of the state."46
Vattel also wrote that short-term pacts, unlike long-term pacts, may be
classified either as "treaties" or "agreements:"
Treaties which do not call for continuous acts, but are fulfilled by a
single act, and are thus executed once for all, those treaties, unless
we prefer to give them another name (see §153), those conventions,
those compacts, which are executed by an act done once for all and
not by successive acts, are, when once carried out, fully and defi-
nitely consummated. 7
These passages from Vattel account for the distinction which the
Framers made between treaties and other compacts. Long-term pacts
which are important enough to warrant the attention of the supreme
power who contracts in the name of the state (i.e. the President) are
necessarily treaties within the meaning of the Constitution, and other
pacts may or may not be "treaties.""5
This nation's first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, echoed
the distinction between transitory agreements which can be conve-
niently dropped, and treaties which may provide otherwise. Jefferson
wrote the following words of caution to President Washington:
It is desirable, in many instances, to exchange mutual advantages
by Legislative Acts rather than by Treaty: because the former,
though understood to be in consideration of each other, and there-
fore greatly respected, yet when they become too inconvenient, can
be dropped at the will of either party: whereas stipulations by Trea-
ty are forever irrevocable but by joint consent, let a change of cir-
cumstances render them ever so burthensome 9
46. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572 (this case is discussed at length
in Section D below). Numerous scholars have agreed that Vattel's definition of "trea-
ty" applies to the Constitution. See e.g. Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers
of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts?" 3 U. CHI. L. REV.
453 (1936). Vattel was cited repeatedly during the Constitutional Convention. See
infra note 58.
47. VATrTEL, supra note 45, §192.
48. At one time, the Department of State-Legal Adviser contended that "Vattel's
distinction has nothing to do with 'important' or unimportant." Congressional Over-
sight of Executive Agreements - 1975: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 392 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearings] (Department of State
Legal Adviser's reply to Senate Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum on certain
Middle East agreements). Apparently the State Department Legal Adviser, Mr. Mon-
roe Leigh, did not realize that routine agreements made by subordinate officials
would not be treaties according to Vattel's distinction because those agreements do
not require approval from the supreme "sovereigns who contract in the name of the
state."
49. Thomas Jefferson, Report of the Secretary of State to the President (Jan. 18,
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The definition of "treaty," as that word is used in the Constitution,
is not the same as the definition that is prevalent in modern interna-
tional law. The Supreme Court has explained that,
[t]he word treaty has more than one meaning. Under principles of
international law, the word ordinarily refers to an international
agreement concluded between sovereigns, regardless of the manner
in which the agreement is brought into force. Under the United
States Constitution, of course, the word "treaty" has a far more
restrictive meaning."0
Under the Constitution, the word "treaty" necessarily applies to ac-
cords of importance and permanence, which in turn depends upon
whether the accord is important enough to warrant the President's
scrutiny, and upon whether the accord is irrevocable for a considerable
time. A quarter century is manifestly a "considerable time,"5 and
1791), in 18 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 565, 570 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971). See
also 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
372-73 (1902) (stating that "[tihe danger of reciprocal legislation is that either coun-
try can repeal or modify its own legislation and deprive citizens of the other country
of the protection formerly afforded"). See generally supra note 16. Incidentally, Presi-
dents have often entered into commitments binding only upon themselves. See, e.g.,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 510, (1920) (stating that "it was far pref-
erable that ... we might be proceeding under a treaty which was the law of the
land and not merely by a direction of the Chief Executive which would lapse when
that particular executive left office."). James Wilson, who attended the Constitutional
Convention, and was also a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, explained that public offi-
cials who lack power to authorize treaties may nevertheless authorize promises and
engagements with other countries, provided that those compacts bind only the offi-
cials who have approved them, rather than invalidly attempting to bind the nation
after those officials have left office. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 155 (James
D. Andrews ed., 1896).
50. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1981) (citations omitted). The
Weinberger Court also observed that: "[a] 'treaty' which requires only the consent of
the President is not an Article II treaty," thus implying that some international
accords do "require" more than the President's consent.
51. Congressman Otis Pike once asked National Security Adviser Henry
Kissinger the following question: "For how long a period of years could an executive
agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years,
for example?" Dr. Kissinger replied that a 25-year agreement would, in his opinion
as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, "look more like a treaty
to me." The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)
and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), Including an Associated Protocol,
Signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 391, 407 (1972) (Congressional briefing by National
Security Adviser Kissinger on the five-year Interim Agreement submitted to Congress
instead of the Senate) [hereinafter Kissinger Briefing]. Suppose Presidents Clinton
and Yeltsin signed an accord to put people on Mars within 25 years. This would
have to be an Article II treaty if it forbade U.S. withdrawal (e.g. in the event Rus-
sia invaded a neighbor) and unless the U.S. merely leased Russian equipment in
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anything over six years is "considerable" for constitutional purposes.
Six years is the maximum term of office for federal elected offi-
cials, and therefore commitments which exceed six years greatly im-
pinge upon the American people's liberty to reshape foreign policy. The
Constitution was intended to secure the people's liberty to manage
their affairs, both domestic and foreign, and the liberty to manage
foreign affairs cannot be legally forfeited if a third of Senators vote
"no." The U.S.-Japan Pact is the only international accord ever en-
forced by the United States, over the objections of more than one-third
of the Senate, which has pledged continued enforcement for more than
six years.
The twin standards of importance and duration are easily applied
to international accords, and they are also judicially manageable. As
will be seen below, these standards of importance and duration are
supported by usage of the terms "treaty" and "agreement" during both
the Articles of Confederation and the early years of the Constitution.
They are also substantiated by the case law, as well as by the conduct
of American foreign affairs since 1776.
B. "Treaties" Under the Articles of Confederation
The Framers considered the duration of compacts to be very im-
portant. They required, in the Articles of Confederation, that any state
seeking congressional approval for an interstate treaty specify accu-
rately "how long it shall continue." 2
Under the Articles of Confederation, each state was akin to a
foreign nation with respect to every other state, so a "treaty" between
two confederated states was analogous to an international "treaty"
under the Constitution. It follows that the meaning of an interstate
"treaty" under the Articles of Confederation can illuminate the mean-
ing of the same word in Article II of the Constitution.
Under the Articles, the states granted powers to the Federal Con-
gress, including the exclusive power to make treaties with other na-
tions.' With regard to treaties between states, the Articles of Confed-
eration said: "No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confed-
eration or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled.. .."5' Thus, when commission-
return for an up-front payment (the U.S. would then have no ongoing obligation).
52. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (1781).
53. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1781) (requiring two-thirds approval of
Congress for foreign treaties).
54. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (1781). This article also required con-
gressional assent for any "conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty" between a state
and any "King, prince or state," but the word "state" as quoted here has always
been understood to mean a state outside of the Confederation. See generally supra
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ers from Virginia and Maryland met at Mount Vernon in 1785 to settle
differences over their common waterways, a controversy arose as to
whether the resulting Mount Vernon Compact55 had to be submitted
to Congress for approval. One of the leading Virginia legislators,
James Madison, wrote the following to James Monroe:
The Compact with Maryd. has been ratified. It was proposed to
submit it to Congs. for their sanction, as being within the word
Treaty used in the Confederation. This was oppd. It was then at-
tempted to transmit it to our Delegates to be by them simply laid
before Congs. Even this was negatived by a large Majority.56
Mr. Madison felt that the Mount Vernon Compact was necessarily a
"treaty, confederation, or alliance" within the meaning of the Articles
of Confederation, but his fellow Virginia legislators felt otherwise.
This controversy about the Mount Vernon Compact flared up
again at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, where Mr.
Madison said that:
no two or more states can form among themselves any treaties &c.
without the consent of Congs. Yet Virgia. & Maryd. in one instance
- Pena. & N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, with-
out previous application or subsequent apology. 7
A week later, Maryland Attorney General Luther Martin responded
that the "treaty between Virginia and Maryland about the navigation
of the Chesapeake and Potomac, is no infraction of the confederacy."'
It appears from these statements that the Framers agreed about the
meaning of the free-standing word "treaty," but disagreed about
whether its meaning should be limited by the adjacent terms in the
phrase "treaty, confederation, or alliance." After all, it is a canon of
note 42 (describing rule of noscitur a sociis). Incidentally, the fact that Article VI re-
ferred to any "agreement, alliance, or treaty" is further evidence that the founders
consistently distinguished between the words "agreement" and "treaty."
55. The success of the Mount Vernon Conference, which was hosted by George
Washington, led the Virginia legislature to set up a wider conference, the Annapolis
Convention, which in turn led directly to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The
Mount Vernon Conference was thus "the preliminary to the preliminary." CLINTON
ROssITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 54 (1966). See also George Mason, The
Mount Vernon Compact, in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 812, 812-23 (Robert A.
Rutland ed., 1970) (containing, among other things, the text of the compact). Inciden-
tally, the Mount Vernon Compact is still in force. VA. CODE ANN. §7.1-7 (Michie
1993).
56. James Madison, Letter to James Monroe (Dec. 30, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 465, 466 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973)
(original emphasis). Madison supported the actual compact but felt that proper pro-
cedures should be followed.
57. Madison, supra note 37, at 190 (for June 19, 1787).
58. ROBERT YATES, SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION 119 (1909) (emphasis added) (Martin made his remarks on June 27, 1787 and
during the course of those remarks he repeatedly cited Vattel as authority).
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statutory construction that when words are grouped together and usu-
ally have similar meanings, the more general words are limited by the
special words. 9 Madison and Martin agreed that the Mount Vernon
compact was a "treaty," but disagreed about whether it was a "treaty,
confederation, or alliance."'
There was never any quarrel as to the duration of the Mount
Vernon Compact. The thirteenth article of that compact said: "never to
be repealed or altered by either without the Consent of the other." The
only dispute concerned whether the Articles of Confederation were
intended to affect such compacts not harming the union of states.61
The prevailing view in the Virginia House of Delegates was that the
Articles of Confederation were irrelevant to purely local arrangements
between Virginia and Maryland.
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the Virginia
House of Delegates many years later in the case of Wharton v. Wise,62
in which the Court decided whether the Mount Vernon Compact had
been validly formed under the Articles of Confederation. The Court
held that "[t]he articles inhibiting any treaty, confederation, or alliance
between the States without the consent of Congress were intended to
prevent any union of two or more States, having a tendency to break
up or weaken the league between the whole."' The Wharton Court
concluded that "the compact of 1785 was not prohibited by the Articles
of Confederation. It was not a treaty, confederation or alliance within
the meaning of those words as there used. . . "4 The Court thus
agreed that a pact could necessarily be a "treaty" within the prohibito-
ry language of the Articles of Confederation, but only if that "treaty,
confederation, or alliance" weakened the league, which the Mount
Vernon Compact did not. 5
59. See SINGER, supra note 42, at § 47.15 (describing rule of noscitur a sociis).
60. In a report on the Mount Vernon Compact presented to the Governor of
Maryland in 1885, a member of the Baltimore Bar, I. Nevett Steele, said that the
"question which presents itself is, whether the compact was a 'treaty, confederation
or alliance,' within the true meaning of those words as used in the Articles of Con-
federation, and it seems probable that there was a difference of opinion on this
question among the public men of the time." Appellant's Brief, Wharton v. Wise, 153
U.S. 155 (1894) (No. 1054), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs
(Scholarly Resources, Inc.).
61. The commissioners at the Mount Vernon Conference felt that a compact be-
tween the two states for providing naval protection ought to be submitted "to Con-
gress for their Consent to enter into Compact." 2 Mason, supra note 55, at 815.
Similarly, the Virginia House of Delegates felt that a trade compact involving more
states than just Virginia and Maryland would require the involvement of Congress.
Madison, supra note 56, at 471.
62. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894).
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 171.
65. The Wharton Court essentially ruled against James Madison, without ever
mentioning his name. However, the Supreme Court was aware of Mr. Madison's
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Of course, the word "treaty" in Article II of the Constitution is free
of any limiting context. The limiting context in the Articles of Confed-
eration was the decisive reason for the legitimacy of the Mount Vernon
Compact. Neither the Founders nor the Wharton Court ever expressed
any doubt that the Mount Vernon Compact would have required con-
gressional consent if the Articles of Confederation had inhibited any
"treaty" instead of any "treaty, confederation, or alliance."
The history of the Mount Vernon Compact shows that the Fram-
ers pondered the meaning of the word "treaty," just as there is analysis
today of whether the U.S.-Japan Pact is a "treaty." Both documents
are indeed "treaties" within the definition used by the Framers, and
for the same reasons - both were made by the highest authorities and
both ordinarily forbid revocation for a considerable period of time.
C. Early Treatises on the Subject of "Treaties"
The distinction between treaties and other agreements was exam-
ined by scholars throughout the early years of the Constitution. This
indirect evidence about the Constitution's treaty provisions is useful
since much of the direct evidence from the Constitutional Convention
has been lost to history.
St. George Tucker was a judge, and a representative alongside
James Madison at the Annapolis Convention, which was the "prelimi-
nary" to the Constitutional Convention." In 1803, Tucker cited Vattel
as authority for the meaning of the word "treaty" in the Constitution:
Here we find a distinction between treaties, alliances, and confeder-
ations; and agreements or compacts. The former relate ordinarily to
subjects of great national magnitude and importance, and are often
perpetual, or made for a considerable period of time; the power of
making these is altogether prohibited to the individual states..."
This excerpt, and its citation to Vattel, shows yet again that Vattel's
definition of "treaty" was relied upon during the early years of the
Constitution. It was then understood that accords of great national
magnitude and importance, and made for a considerable period of
time, must be "treaties." Tucker went on to say that,
agreements, or compacts, concerning transitory or local affairs, or
such as cannot possibly affect any other interest but that of the
view that Virginia and Maryland had violated the Articles of Confederation by enter-
ing into the Mount Vernon Compact absent congressional consent. See supra note 60.
66. See generally supra note 55.
67. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFER-
ENCE TO THE CONSTITuTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 310 app. (1803). See generally
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571 (stating that "treaty" has the same ba-
sic meaning throughout the Constitution).
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parties, may... be entered into by the respective states, with the
consent of congress. The compact between this state and Maryland,
entered into in the year 1786, may serve as an example of this last
class of public agreements."
This second excerpt shows, once more, that Vattel's definitions of "trea-
ty" and "agreement" were indeed used by the public figures of the
Revolutionary era in their debate about the legality of the Mount
Vernon Compact. That compact was neither a nationally significant
"treaty, alliance, or confederation," nor a mere transitory "agreement."
Rather, the Mount Vernon Compact was, as its name suggests, a "com-
pact" within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. 9
According to Tucker's analysis, compacts of national magnitude
68. TUCKER, supra note 67, at 310 app.
69. This helps to explain why the Framers of the Constitution added the catch-
all term "compact" in the phrase "agreement or compact," instead of just using the
word "agreement." They wanted to ensure that future pacts like the Mount Vernon
Compact would fall within the meaning of Article I. As the Supreme Court has
observed:
In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must
have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the
whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly
added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the Construc-
tion of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this proposition;
and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustri-
ous men who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with
the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully un-
derstood. No word in the instrument, therefore, can be rejected as su-
perfluous or unmeaning; and this principle of construction applies with
peculiar force to the two clauses of the tenth section of the first article,
of which we are now speaking, because the whole of this short section
is directed to the same subject; that is to say, it is employed altogether
in enumerating the rights surrendered by the states; and this is done
with so much clearness and brevity, that we cannot for a moment be-
lieve that a single superfluous word was used, or words which meant
merely the same thing.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 570-71. There has never been any doubt
that the Framers did intend that future pacts similar to the Mount Vernon Compact
should fall within the ambit of the Compact Clause. Tucker had no doubt of this.
See supra text accompanying note 68. Joseph Story viewed this issue the same way;
he wrote that "the consent of Congress may be properly required" for interstate
compacts regulating "the mutual comfort, and convenience of states, bordering on
each other." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 272 (1833). The Supreme Court has endorsed this position of Tucker and
Story; in the case of Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), the Court held that
Virginia and Tennessee did form an Article I "agreement or compact" when those
two states ratified their mutual boundary. Id. at 521. The Court also held in Virgin-
ia v. Tennessee that congressional approval of the boundary agreement could be
"fairly implied" because Congress did not raise any "questions or dispute." Id. at
522. But cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 462 (1977)
(holding that "not all agreements between states are subject to the strictures of the
Compact Clause").
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and considerable duration are necessarily "treaties" within the mean-
ing of the Constitution. This analysis leaves plenty of room for other
"treaties" under the Constitution. Tucker, like Vattel, did not rule out
treaties in which the parties consent to a brief duration, nor did he say
that all short-term pacts are immune from the treaty requirement. He
simply said that accords which have national importance and are made
for a considerable time necessarily fall within the meaning of the word
"treaty" as used in the Constitution.
Another early commentator, Joseph Story, recognized that
Tucker's discussion was somewhat lacking. Seven years before Story
participated in Holmes v. Jennison as a Supreme Court Justice, he
called Tucker's treaty analysis "loose and unsatisfactory,"70 but did
not go so far as to say that Tucker was wrong. Story pointed out that
treaties are often made "for short periods, and upon questions of local
interest, and for temporary objects," and he desired greater clarity
with regard to such accords. Story, in fact, agreed with Tucker that
important long-term accords are necessarily "treaties," as is evidenced
by Story's wholehearted endorsement of Chief Justice Taney's opinion
in Holmes. 1 Story's concurrence in the Holmes case shows that he
and Tucker were "united in theory,"72 in that both viewed Vattel as
authority for the meaning of the word "treaty" in the Constitution.73
D. Several Court Cases Regarding Pacts With Other Nations
Chief Justice Taney quoted extensively from Vattel's Law of Na-
tions in his Holmes opinion.74 That opinion, joined by Justice Story
and two others, contains the most explicit guidance ever given by the
Supreme Court regarding the definition of the word "treaty."7" Al-
70. STORY, supra note 69, at 271.
71. Justice Story declared that Taney's opinion in Holmes "is a masterly one and
does his sound judgment and discrimination very great credit ... . I entirely con-
curred in that opinion with all my heart; and was surprised that it was not unani-
mously adopted." BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 212 (1922).
See also supra text accompanying note 46.
72. President John Adams, during his retirement, remained inquisitive about the
principles, the characters, and the views of the American Bar. In particular, he
wanted to know this: "Are Tucker and Story united in theory?" John Adams, Letter
to Benjamin Waterhouse (Jun. 5, 1813), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 38
(Charles Francis Adams, ed., 1856).
73. It bears emphasis that the frequent occurrence of unimportant and short-
term treaties throughout U.S. history does not in any way contradict the idea that
significant long-term accords are necessarily "treaties."
74. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571.
75. See generally supra text accompanying note 46. One of the nine justices was
absent, and another, Justice Catron, was substantially in accord with Taney's opin-
ion even though he did not technically join in that opinion. The Supreme Court's
Reporter observed "that a majority of the Court concurred in the opinion" of Chief
Justice Taney. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 598. Indeed, the Court's
holdings in Holmes have "been respected and given effect in an unbroken line of
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though the Holmes opinion ostensibly dealt with Article I "treaties,"
the Court in dicta said that its logic applies also to Article II "trea-
ties."76
The plaintiff, George Holmes, had been arrested in Vermont on a
warrant issued by Governor Jennison, in order that Holmes could be
extradited to Canada to face murder charges. The Supreme Court of
Vermont decided that Holmes could lawfully be extradited, but, on
appeal, four of the eight sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices held that
the extradition "agreement" between Vermont and Canada violated
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. A fifth Justice, Mr. Justice
Catron, "had intended to concur" with the opinion delivered by Chief
Justice Taney, but Justice Catron was not prepared to say that an
Article I agreement would exist until the actual delivery of Holmes to
the Canadians, absent any evidence of a request from the Canadi-
ans.7 7 Thus, the Court split evenly with regard to its jurisdiction, and
the case was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Vermont subsequently
concluded that "a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States
was ... adverse to the exercise of the power in question"71 to extra-
dite Holmes without statutory authority "either of congress or of the
state legislature."79 Thus, the Supreme Court of Vermont voided the
accord with Canada, and set George Holmes loose.
In the Holmes case, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Vermont both recognized that important long-term accords (so
important that they are committed to writing and approved by the
highest governmental authorities) are necessarily "treaties," and are to
be distinguished from other accords of lesser permanence or impor-
tance. This is precisely the distinction which some scholars now seek to
abandon by redefining treaties and agreements so that they are inter-
changeable.'
In 1912, seventy-two years after Holmes, the Supreme Court de-
later decisions." Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 70 (1928).
76. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571.
77. Id. at 595.
78. Ex Parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 642 (1840).
79. Id. at 641. The Supreme Court of Vermont also observed that, had the U.S.
Supreme Court been aware of an application to Governor Jennison from the Gov-
ernor General of Lower Canada soliciting the surrender of Holmes, then U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Catron "would have concurred with the other justices, and the
judgment of this court would have been reversed." Id. at 641. The Canadian applica-
tion to Governor Jennison, which was accompanied by a copy of the indictment
against Holmes, sought a one-time-only deal. Id. at 632, 633. This explains why the
Supreme Court of Vermont classified this transaction as a compact that could have
proceeded with authority from congress, instead of as a treaty. (In contrast, Taney
had not been prepared to say that the compact was a treaty, absent any evidence of
a written accord.)
80. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 303, Reporter's note 8.
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cided the case of B. Altman & Co. v. United States.8' The Altman
Court held that a commercial agreement with France82 "was not a
treaty possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Sen-
ate," thus implicitly reaffirming that some compacts do require Senate
approval. Indeed, both opposing parties in Altman explicitly agreed
that Holmes is proper authority for the meaning of the word "treaty" in
the Constitution.'
The Altman Court held that, although not an Article II treaty, the
commercial agreement with France was nevertheless a "treaty" within
the meaning of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. That fact gave the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear Altman's appeal. In addressing the
merits, the Court upheld the lower court's decision that a bronze bust
imported by Altman was not "statuary" dutiable at the low rate set by
the commercial agreement.
The Altman case offers no support for the proposition that treaties
and other agreements are wholly interchangeable." The commercial
agreement at issue in Altman never necessitated Senate approval
because it was always revocable upon short notice. The agreement had
been unilaterally revoked by the United States long before the Su-
preme Court issued its opinion, and the agreement did not pledge the
United States to any long-term commitment. This commercial agree-
ment thus fell squarely into the Holmes category of international com-
pacts that are not necessarily treaties within the meaning of the Con-
stitution.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Altman in the case of United
States v. Belmont.' The Belmont Court, in an opinion by Justice
Sutherland," held that an international compact "is not always a trea-
ty which requires the participation of the Senate." Thus, Belmont, like
81. B. Altman & Co. v. U.S., 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
82. Protocol Respecting Commerce, May 28, 1898, U.S.-Fr., T.S. No 98. This
agreement stated that it was agreed upon "in accordance with the provisions of
Section 3 of the United States Tariff Act of 1897." Id. at art. II. The agreement did
not commit to any particular duration, and it was terminated by the United States
in 1909 when a new tariff law took effect. 7 Bevans 857. The French Government
objected to the termination because the agreement contained no termination provi-
sion, but the State Department replied that termination was implicit "in the absence
of enabling legislation by Congress." V GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 429 (1943). This position of the State Department (with regard to com-
mercial accords) is entirely consistent with the Restatement, according to which "in
the absence of provisions stating or implying the contrary, a right to withdraw may
be implied." RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 332 com b.
83. 224 U.S. at 601; Id. at 585 (argument of plaintiff); Id. at 591 (argument of
the United States).
84. Contra HENKIN, supra note 10, at 423.
85. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
86. Incidentally, Justice Sutherland also delivered the Court's opinion in Curtiss-
Wright, supra note 41.
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Altman, implies that some international pacts do require Senate par-
ticipation while some do not. Justice Sutherland's opinion in Belmont,
like his other writings,s" is inconsistent with the complete
interchangeability of treaties and executive agreements.
The compact at issue in Belmont involved an exchange of diplo-
matic correspondence between President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet
Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff, in which the Soviets assigned to the
United States Government legal title to all amounts owed to the Sovi-
ets by American citizens." The purpose of the Litvinov Assignment
was to enable the Soviet Union to reach a "final settlement" 9 of its
claims through diplomatic rather than legal channels, and this purpose
was accomplished at the stroke of a pen. The Belmont Court held that
the Litvinov Assignment provided a valid legal basis for the United
States to recover Russian deposits in a New York bank, notwithstand-
ing New York law.
The executive agreement at issue in Belmont, like that in Altman,
did not pledge the United States to any long-term commitment, and
therefore it was not required to be an Article II "treaty." Belmont was
later cited approvingly in United States v. Pink," which again in-
volved the Litvinov Assignment.
The Supreme Court addressed another international accord in
Dames and Moore v. Regan,91 in an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, now the Chief Justice. This case involved the deal with
Iran which freed American hostages, and which also set the stage for
resolving claims between the citizens and governments of the two
countries." Dames and Moore argued that the Treasury Secretary
should not be allowed to enforce the U.S.-Iran agreement by tying up
funds which the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran owed to Dames
and Moore. The Court held that the U.S.-Iran agreement was legiti-
87. With regard to the distinction between treaties and other international agree-
ments, Justice Sutherland most definitely had a sense of which are which:
[I]nternational agreements which are not treaties in the full constitu-
tional sense, are perhaps confined to such as affect administrative mat-
ters, as distinguished from policies, and those which are of only indi-
vidual concern, or limited scope and duration, as distinguished from
those of general consequence and permanent character.
GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 120 (1919), quot-
ed in Borchard, supra note 3, at 671. It is thus erroneous to assert that Justice
Sutherland never differentiated between Article II treaties and other agreements.
Contra HENIUN, supra note 10, at 179.
88. Exchange of Notes Regarding General Relations, Nov. 16, 1933, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
11 Bevans 1248, 1256-58 [hereinafter the Litvinov Assignment].
89. Id.
90. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1942).
91. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981).
92. Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, Jan. 18, 1981, U.S.-Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223.
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mate since "Congress acquiesced,"93 and since "the President does
have some measure of power to enter into executive agreements with-
out obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate."94
Thus, the Supreme Court implied in Dames and Moore, as it had
in Altman and Belmont, that the President does not have complete
power to avoid the treaty process by negotiating executive agreements,
even if Congress has "placed its stamp of approval on such agree-
ments."5 In holding that the claims settlement agreement with Iran
did not require a two-thirds Senate vote, the Court in Dames and
Moore cited the Litvinov assignment as precedent.9" Like the Litvinov
Assignment, the U.S.-Iran agreement was short-term, with respect to
claims by private parties against the respective governments. As the
Supreme Court observed, the agreement imposed a deadline of six
months for transfer of assets frozen in U.S. banks.97 The U.S.-Iran
agreement would not have bothered the Founders, who consistently
distinguished between treaties and other agreements.9" The U.S.-Iran
agreement was valid because of its short-term character, and because
more than one-third of the Senate did not reject it.
E. Customary Practices Regarding Executive Agreements
Several times in the history of the United States Constitution, the
meaning of the words "treaty" and "agreement" has been debated. All
of those controversies were resolved in conformity with Vattel's defini-
tions.
In 1817, the United States and Great Britain entered into the
Rush-Bagot Agreement,' which led to the disarmament of the Great
Lakes. This was not a long-term commitment, as is evident from the
provision allowing each party to cancel the deal with six months' notice
to the other."° The Rush-Bagot Agreement was therefore properly
implemented by President Monroe without submission to the Senate
for a two-thirds vote. Monroe did obtain Senate consent a year later, in
93. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
94. Id. at 682.
95. Id. at 680.
96. Id. at 682.
97. Id. at 665.
98. See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text.
99. Arrangement Respecting Naval Forces, Apr. 29, 1817, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
231 [hereinafter Rush-Bagot Agreement].
100. "If either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation,
and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding
after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice." Id. President Mon-
roe felt that this aspect of the arrangement was sufficiently important to mention in
his first State of the Union Address. James Monroe, First Annual Message (Dec. 2,
1817), in 2 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 580,
581 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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order to please the British Ambassador and appease disgruntled Sena-
tors, but he did not think it absolutely necessary that the compact be
communicated to the Senate.'' That is, he did not think that the
compact was blatantly "such an one as requires the advice and consent
of the Senate.""0 2 President Monroe served in the Federal Congress
prior to 1789, and also participated in the Virginia Ratification Con-
vention, so he might be expected to have had a good grasp of the word
"treaty" in the Constitution.
Another major accord was the arrangement by which the Republic
of Texas became part of the United States in 1845. President Tyler had
negotiated a treaty for this purpose, but a majority of the Senate re-
jected it.'0 3 Later, when the electorate had become more favorable to
annexation, President Tyler made an innovative suggestion to the
House:
[W]hile I have regarded the annexation to be accomplished by trea-
ty as the most suitable form in which it could be effected, should
Congress deem it proper to resort to any other expedient compati-
ble with the Constitution and likely to accomplish the same object I
stand prepared to yield my most prompt and active cooperation."'
The House subsequently deemed that a joint resolution, offering state-
hood to Texas, would suffice instead of a treaty. Congressmen reasoned
that the transaction would be of brief duration, and so would not nec-
essarily constitute a "treaty" within the meaning of the Constitution.
For instance, Congressman Bayly observed that, from "the language of
the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of Holmes vs.
101. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams (Monroe's successor as President) re-
corded in his diary the following entry:
Met and spoke to Mr. Bagot this morning on my way to the President's.
He asked me if it was the intention of the President to communicate to
Congress the ... arrangement concerning armaments on the Lakes,
which he said was a sort of treaty. I spoke of it to the President, who
did not think it necessary that they should be communicated. It has
been usual heretofore with the message at the opening of the session of
Congress to send a collection of documents with it relating to the prin-
cipal subjects mentioned in it. This was not done at the present session,
and some inconvenience has resulted from the omission.
Diary entry (Jan. 14, 1818), in 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QuINcy ADAMS 41-42 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1969).
102. See James Monroe, Letter to the Senate (April 6, 1818), in 2 COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 602 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897). It is also noteworthy that Congress had authorized the President to lay up
the warships on the Great Lakes. Ch. 62, Para. 4, 6, 3 Stat. 217, 218 (1815).
103. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 698 (1844) (only 16 Senators voted for
the treaty, while 35 voted against it).
104. John Tyler, Letter to the House of Representatives (June 10, 1844),in 5 COM-
PILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2176, 2180 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897). Incidentally, President Tyler was President Truman's great-
great uncle.
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Jennison .... it seems that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Rep.
Winthrop] is mistaken in supposing that all stipulations and agree-
ments between nations are necessarily treaties."' 5 Congress thus ap-
proved the joint resolution,'" Texas accepted Tyler's offer, and Con-
gress finished the entire international transaction by admitting Texas
as a state.
The Texas Accord was not a long-term international compact.
Texas quickly lost its national sovereignty and became a state subject
to the control of the American people. The annexation of Texas in 1845
is no precedent for long-term pacts that are not "treaties." Likewise,
the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 was perfectly constitutional.'
In 1972, when President Nixon submitted the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty to the Senate, he simultaneously submitted an Interim Agree-
ment, regarding strategic arms limitation, to Congress.' The Na-
tional Security Adviser at the time was Henry Kissinger, later to be-
come Secretary of State. Kissinger explained the rationale for Nixon's
105. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 124 (1845). Also see generally supra
note 46 and accompanying text (quoting the Chief Justice in the Holmes case). The
theme of Congressman Bayly's remarks has been recurrent throughout U.S. history;
for example, consider this statement of Congressman Dow with regard to the SALT
I Interim Agreement:
Some days ago, I was curious as to why this particular agreement was
not handled as a treaty, but instead, comes as an agreement to be ac-
cepted by both Houses of Congress. The Library of Congress has given
me some good reasons, and I want to share them with my colleagues.
This agreement .... does not seem to have the permanence that would
be expected in the treaty form.
118 CONG. REc. 29102 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dow). See generally note 51 supra
(discussing the Interim Agreement).
106. Far from being ignored, the constitutionality of the joint resolution was ex-
tensively debated. Senators on both sides of the issue concurred in the opinion that,
as Senator Merrick put it:
[Were Texas a terrestrial paradise, its sands all gold, its streams am-
brosial nectar, and its hills and rocks the bread of life - though it
should promise us peace without end, and strength, prosperity, and
glory such as the world has never seen - yet should this measure not
be adopted here, if it be forbidden by the constitution. To support that
constitution we have all registered our oath in Heaven's chancery. The
obligations of that oath are paramount to all earthly considerations; and
there cannot be a senator here who would not spurn Texas from him as
a most loathsome, hideous thing . . . if she could be obtained only by
our making such a sacrifice.
CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 229 (1845) (agreeing with Sen. Choate)
(original emphasis). The Senate vote in favor of the joint resolution was 27 to 25.
CONG. GLOBE, 28th, 2d Sess. 362-363 (1845).
107. The joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands was approved by a vote
of 42 to 21, well over the two-thirds that would have been required for a treaty. 31
CONG. REc. 6712 (1898). Incidentally, not even a treaty could cede territory of an
unwilling state. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
108. See supra note 51.
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approach by pointing out that the Interim Agreement would last for
only five years. As Kissinger put it, the foreign affairs of the United
States raise an "important Constitutional question: At what point does
an executive agreement achieve character of such permanence that it
should really more properly be in the form of a treaty?"1" Congress
agreed with Kissinger that accords which last for only five years, less
than a Senator's term of office, do not necessarily fall within the defi-
nition of the word "treaty" as used in the Constitution."'
The State Department has long maintained that executive agree-
ments are impermissible when an accord should instead be dealt with
by treaty. This policy is stated in a document known as Circular
175.1"l The current version of this document lists eight criteria which
should be given "due consideration" in deciding whether a particular
accord must be dealt with as a treaty, and whether a congressional-
executive or a sole-executive agreement would be appropriate:
a. The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or
risks affecting the nation as a whole;
b. Whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws;
c. Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enact-
ment of subsequent legislation by the Congress;
d. Past United States practice with respect to similar agree
ments;
e. The preference of the Congress with respect to a particular
type of agreement;
f. The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
g. The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt
conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding
a routine or short-term agreement; and
h. The general international practice with respect to similar
agreements."
109. Kissinger Briefing, supra note 51, at 407.
110. See, e.g., supra note 105 (statement of Rep. Dow).
111. The State Department issued Circular 175 in 1955, stating that:
Executive agreements shall not be used when the subject matter should
be covered by treaty ... Where there is any serious question as to
whether an international agreement should be made in the form of a
treaty .... whenever circumstances permit, consultation shall be had
with appropriate Congressional leaders ...
U.S. DEPIr OF STATE, CIRcuLAR No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L. L. &
PoLIcY 784 (1956).
112. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN. § 721.3, reprinted in 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 285. From time to time, various scholars have
listed similar criteria to differentiate executive agreements from treaties, and such
lists almost invariably include "duration." See, e.g., Letter from Professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Harvard Law School, to Senator Ernest F. Hollings 5 (October 18, 1994)
[hereinafter Slaughter Letter] reprinted in GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings
on S. 2467 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 286-290 (1994). Duration is not a mere indicator of whether to sub-
mit an accord as "treaty." To the contrary, Professor Slaughter agrees with Professor
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Circular 175 does not say which of these criteria determine whether an
executive agreement can be used instead of a treaty, nor does it say
which of the criteria determine the type of executive agreement. From
a constitutional point of view, criterion "g" is crucial in the first deter-
mination; accords which are neither "short-term" nor "routine" are out-
side the scope of executive agreements.
Circular 175 states that the Senate possesses constitutional pow-
ers which could be "invaded" or "compromised" if the Circular 175
criteria are carelessly applied."' Indeed, the Senate's Office of Legis-
lative Counsel has taken the position that "[s]trong support exists for
the proposition that an agreement which... qualifies as a treaty un-
der the 'Circular 175' criteria employed by the Department of State is
in violation of the Constitution if entered into by the President without
the advice and consent of the Senate.""' Circular 175 contradicts, yet
again, the view that treaties and executive agreements are entirely in-
terchangeable under Article II of the Constitution.
V. THE U.S.-JAPAN PLUTONIUM PACT
When President Reagan submitted the U.S.-Japan Pact to Con-
gress in 1987, the Senate rejected a joint resolution"' that would
have defeated it."' The Senate vote was 53 to 30, short of a two-
thirds majority."7
The terms of this thirty-year nuclear cooperation accord say that
it is ordinarily irrevocable, and that it is binding upon future Presi-
dents who might otherwise oppose it. This accord is currently facilitat-
ing the worldwide proliferation of weapons usable plutonium, despite
growing sentiment in favor of a proposal to ban plutonium production.
President Clinton has, according to press reports, expressed the view
that plutonium production
"is not justified on either economic or national security grounds,
Tribe that some international accords "must... be submitted to the Senate for
ratification by a two thirds majority of Senators present" (emphasis added). Id. at 6.
See generally Tribe's Statement, supra note 19.
113. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN. § 721.3, reprinted in 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 285.
114. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 373 (Senate Office of Legislative
Counsel memorandum on certain Middle East agreements).
115. S.J. REs. 241, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
116. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 123(d), 42 U.S.C. §2153(d) (1988). (Section 123
specifies that any proposed nuclear cooperation agreement will not take effect if
Congress promptly passes a concurrent resolution opposing the agreement, and of
course the President would then be constitutionally entitled to veto the resolution).
117. See 134 CONG., REC. supra note 5 (the 17 Senators who did not vote were
absent).
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and its accumulation creates serious proliferation and security dan-
gers".... [but] in an Oct. 20 letter to Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark
[he said the] "proposal would breach existing U.S. commitments,"
such as an agreement allowing Japan to extract plutonium from
fuel that originated in the United States, and would "lead to con-
frontation with Russia and our allies."'18
The U.S.-Japan Pact may thus be the crucial factor preventing the
nations of the world from halting the production of the most dangerous
material on Earth, or at least may be providing our leaders with an
excuse to avoid taking responsibility. If this is indeed true, then the
U.S.-Japan Pact may rank as the most consequential violation of the
Constitution in the history of the United States.
North Korea used the U.S.-Japan Pact to justify its own plutoni-
um program, citing the U.S. "double-standard" by which Japan can
have tons of plutonium while North Korea cannot1 , and there is ev-
ery reason to expect that other countries will use this justification in
the future. The security risks inherent in the U.S.-Japan Pact led to
significant Senate opposition in 1988,2' and Senators have also ex-
pressed grave concerns about the severe environmental and public
health risks posed by the pact.12" '
118. Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Refuses to Ask Britain to Halt New Plutonium
Plant, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A10.
119. Jonathan Power, Japan's Growing Nuclear Equivocation, BALT. MORN. SUN,
Dec. 10, 1993, at 31A (quoting North Korea's official press agency). See also David
E. Sanger, Effort to Solve Energy Woes Clashes With Nuclear Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Au-
gust 20, 1994, at 1 (stating that North Korea has consistently made the straightfor-
ward argument that they should not be forbidden to do what Japan is allowed to
do).
120. For example, Senator Glenn said that "[t]here is no parallel in the history of
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements that I am aware of for such a limitation on our
right to suspend a consent for a foreign nuclear activity, especially with regard to
activities involving ton quantities of nuclear weapons-usable material in a nonnuclear
weapons state. Ton quantities of this plutonium, I am talking about, that will be
transferred. Do you know how much it takes to make a nuclear weapon with pluto-
nium if you know what you are doing? Somewhere under 5 kilograms." 134 CONG.
REC. 4511 (1988) (a kilogram is equivalent to 2.2 pounds). Senator Cranston noted
that, according to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S.-Japan Pact
poses "an extreme environmental hazard, a proliferation peril, and a would-be
terrorist's dream come true." Id. at 4543. Senator Helms pointed out that, "[w]hile
the proposed agreement could be suspended by the United States unilaterally, there
is concern that the terms of this suspension right are such that it can never be
exercised." Id. at 4506.
121. U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary has stated that, "plutonium is poten-
tially dangerous, even in very small amounts, whether it is ingested or inhaled.
Plutonium from reactors can also be used to make nuclear weapons." Thomas W.
Lippman, Pluto Boy's Mission: Soften the Reaction, WASH. POST, March 7, 1994, at
All. However, Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
has distributed a video cartoon which falsely claims that bombs would be "extremely
difficult" to make with reactor plutonium, and has also falsely asserted that no proof
exists of plutonium's carcinogenic effects in humans. Id. Likewise, Japanese Energy
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Article 12 of the basic agreement establishes the grounds for ei-
ther party to suspend cooperation if the other party violates the agree-
ment.122 Article 3 of the implementing agreement also allows for uni-
lateral suspension, but only "in the most extreme circumstances of
exceptional concern," and provided that this concern is "from a non-
proliferation or national security point of view," and if, furthermore,
the suspension is "for the minimum period of time necessary."" Ac-
cording to the State Department, Japan has such "outstanding non-
proliferation credentials" that "[amny instance of increased proliferation
or national security risk in the case of Japan would inevitably arise
out of "extreme circumstances of exceptional concern." "4 Even if one
accepts the State Department's assurances to Congress, the U.S.-Japan
Pact's suspension limitations make it impossible for the United States
to suspend the pact on the grounds that: 1) the United States simply
made a policy error in agreeing to the pact in the first place, or 2)
because new environmental or public health risks warrant suspension,
or 3) because Japanese authorities have consistently given false infor-
mation to their people, or 4) because plutonium is lost or mysteriously
turns up on the black market, or 5) for any number of other reasons.
The minutes to the implementing agreement allow for suspension
of the U.S.-Japan Pact if actions of "governments of third countries"
cause the U.S.-Japan activities to "clearly result in a significant in-
crease in the risk of nuclear proliferation or in the threat to the na-
tional security of the suspending party."'25 However, suspension of
the U.S.-Japan Agreement remains impermissible if: 1) the U.S. mere-
ly concludes that it ran a foolish risk when it entered into the U.S.-Ja-
pan Pact despite the threat of plutonium theft, or 2) the U.S. concludes
that Japanese inattention to environmental or public health risks war-
rants suspension, or 3) the U.S. believes that assisting Japan's plutoni-
um program makes it too difficult to oppose weapons-usable programs
throughout the world, or 4) the prospects for developing safer energy
sources become more promising.
The terms of the U.S-Japan Pact state that the pact cannot be
dropped at will by the United States for a considerable period of time.
The Pact is not scheduled to expire until the year 2018. If this pact
Minister Satsuki Eda has asserted that reactor plutonium is "insufficient" for nuclear
weapons. Richard Read, Nuclear Work in Japan Raises Many Concerns, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 23, 1993, at A3. Although President Reagan agreed to the U.S.-Japan Pact for
fear that the Japanese would take their business elsewhere, the United States has
consistently discouraged Japan from using plutonium. David Holley, Japan Pursues
Plutonium Reactor, OREGONIAN, Mar. 20, 1994, at A5.
122. H.R. Doc. No. 128, supra note 4, at 16.
123. Id. at 44.
124. United States-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 528 (1987 & 1988) (State
Department's analysis of suspension rights under the proposed agreement).
125. H.R. Doc. No. 128, supra note 4, at 62.
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now continues in force, it will continue to be manifestly unconstitution-
al, unless the President convinces two-thirds of the Senate to endorse
the U.S.-Japan arrangements, or until the Pact is renegotiated so as to
remove the long-term commitment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Important long-term accords, such as the U.S.-Japan Pact of 1988,
require a two-thirds Senate concurrence. This was the unmistakable
and overwhelming intent of the Framers of the Constitution, and has
been the consistent practice throughout every phase of American histo-
ry. In summary, Senate consent or acquiescence is requisite for any
international covenant which is significant enough to warrant the
scrutiny of the President and which, by its terms, may not be termina-
ble at will by the United States for six years or more.
There is an urgent need for the three branches of government to
reaffirm that a line of demarcation exists between executive agree-
ments and Article II treaties, and for the courts to decide whether that
line, whatever may be its precise contours, has been crossed. That is
"the $64 question.""6 The U.S.-Japan Pact proves that the line of de-
marcation has not been merely crossed; it has been steamrolled.
The U.S.-Japan Pact is manifestly a treaty within the meaning of
the Constitution. Since it has not been legally ratified, the President
has no authority to enforce it. Unlike other nuclear cooperation ac-
cords, the U.S.-Japan Pact was rejected by more than one-third of the
Senators voting. Thus, the Pact is, and always has been, ultra vires
and without legal force. Perhaps the President can persuade Japan to
join him in treating the Pact as a nullity, or perhaps the matter will
end up in court. An ongoing accord violative of the treaty-making pro-
cedure is no more immune from judicial scrutiny than would be an ac-
cord passed in violation of the Bill of Rights.' 7 Even in the unfortu-
126. This quote is from an interesting session of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, excerpted below:
Senator Gillette: A few years ago I prepared what I thought was a good
paper on this thing, and I wrote the State Department and asked them
how they drew the line, how did they differentiate between what they
considered a treaty and what they considered an executive agreement,
and they answered me that a treaty was a document that you had to
send to the Senate for confirmation, and an executive agreement was
one that you did not.
Senator Smith of New Jersey: That was a very satisfactory reply; the
$64 question was still left.
Senator Gillette: That is actually the way they explained it.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
463 (1952).
127. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 (1990). The Court in
Munoz-Flores held that a "law passed in violation of the Origination Clause
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nate event that the President continues to enforce the U.S.-Japan Pact,
it is no precedent for similar pacts such as the upcoming EURATOM
accord, which may face opposition from one-third of the Senate."
The Supreme Court invalidated an executive agreement for the
first time in 1957, in the case of Reid v. Covert."2 The Court then de-
clared that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitu-
tion." 3' To be sure, the American people have always aspired to have
a "government of laws and not of men."' It would be unfortunate if
today we instead have a government which places international ac-
cords above the law, by allowing the sovereign prerogatives of future
Presidents and electorates to be bargained away without the strong
would . . . be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both
Houses and signed by the President than would be a law passed in violation of the
First Amendment." The Origination Clause, of course, says that "All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
1. Similarly, Professor Tribe has pointed out that "it is not the prerogative of those
who temporarily hold public office to abdicate structural constitutional protections -
and, of course, it is not within their power thereby to bind the nation for all time
by such abdication." Tribe's Statement, supra note 19, at 12.
128. According to the Supreme Court, "That an unconstitutional action has been
taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a
later date." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969). It should be empha-
sized that there is apparently nothing unconstitutional about those nuclear coopera-
tion agreements which have been approved by two-thirds of the Senate (either by
acquiescence or by vote). Furthermore, there is apparently nothing unconstitutional
about the terms of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2153), because
those terms do not purport to authorize cooperation agreements that bind the United
States for more than six years over the objections of one-third of the Senate (the
Atomic Energy Act can and should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
Constitution).
129. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This case involved agreements with Great
Britain and Japan which authorized trial by court martial of American civilians in
time of peace. The Court held these agreements violative of the Bill of Rights. This
holding eased Senators' concerns that international accords should be kept in con-
formity with the Constitution (if not in pursuance of it). See generally S. REP. No.
1716, supra note 1. The Court in Reid dramatically interposed itself in the domain
of foreign relations, in order to rescue the Bill of Rights, and did so fourteen years
after one of the unconstitutional accords had been signed. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
at 15. However, there need not be any such interposition with regard to the U.S.-
Japan nuclear pact; the courts can simply put the onus with the President and the
Senate, where it belongs. It is for the Senate and the President to decide whether to
ratify the U.S.-Japan accord, and they are by no means obligated to do so. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 16, § 311(3) (opining that a nation may "invoke a violation
of its internal law to vitiate its consent to be bound [if] the violation was manifest
and concerned a rule of fundamental importance"). If there is one thing that has al-
ways been manifest to all nations of the world, it is this: that the one way to ob-
tain an indisputably durable commitment from the United States is by getting two-
thirds of the Senate to go along.
130. 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
131. MASS. CONST. part I, art. XXX (written by John Adams and associates in
1780, during the Revolutionary War, and adopted that year by freely elected del-
egates).
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Senate approval required by the Constitution.
This is no plea for isolationism - a policy which has no place in
this day and age.'32 The United States must actively pursue a happy
and healthy world by making significant short-term as well as long-
term international commitments. Long-term accords, however, still re-
quire the strong two-thirds Senate approval in adherence to the Con-
stitution. Without such adherence, the United States risks incautious
commitments which could spark renewed isolationism, or worse.
During recent decades, international accords have grown in both
quantity and influence, so it is more important than ever for such
accords to be formed using the proper procedures. The two-thirds Sen-
ate procedure is meant to restrain the United States from rashly en-
tangling itself in lasting foreign commitments, and is not supposed to
provide an appendant method of oligating future leaders, or of perma-
nently compromising vital American resources.133 The treaty safe-
guard remains crucial as we approach a new century, which promises
rapid changes and which will require a flexible foreign policy to deal
with those changes. Above all else, the future will require a decent
132. See generally Roosevelt's Address at San Diego Touching on Home and For-
eign Problems, N. Y. TIMES, October 3, 1935, at A14 (in which President Franklin
Roosevelt spoke of "[o]ur national determination to keep free of foreign wars and
foreign entanglements . . . "). There is a big difference between opposing entangle-
ments, as Roosevelt did in 1935, and favoring restrained and cautious entanglement,
as the Constitution does. Indeed, it is not inconsistent to favor the Constitution's
treaty process, while at the same time urging that the U.S. greatly expand its inter-
national role. American diplomacy has for many years followed an isolationist hands-
off path regarding a wide range of touchy "internal affairs," including exploitation of
child labor, insecure conditions for the elderly and disabled, unequal treatment of
women, and rampant deforestation. These are all crucial international economic prob-
lems, and merely frowning upon them will not uplift our trade partners or prevent
overpopulation. When we marginalize these problems (and others such as unsafe
workplaces, pollution, and substandard wages) we make them worse, while sacrific-
ing good American jobs to countries that can make products at unfairly low costs.
We need not amend the treaty process; what we need are internationalist leaders
who understand how to use it in concert with other nations.
133. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, § 594
(1801), reprinted in H.R. Doc No. 256, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 115, 296 (1991)
(unequivocally stating that the two-thirds provision was meant "to restrain the Exec-
utive and Senate from entangling and embroiling our affairs with those of Europe").
See also JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 686 (E.H. Scott
ed., 1893) (recounting that "it had been too easy in the present Congress to make
treaties altho' nine States were required for the purpose"). As Madison's comment
illustrates, the Framers of the Constitution purposely raised the treaty-making hur-
dle higher than it had been under the Articles of Confederation, by necessitating the
cooperation of the President in addition to the two-thirds approval that had been
needed under the Articles. See supra note 53. The strong consensus required by the
Constitution has ensured that the United States does not lightly abrogate or under-
mine its treaty obligations, and in this sense the treaty process is not only a hurdle,
but is also "a bulwark" which has made the United States a reliable international
partner. Slaughter Letter, supra note 112, at 7.
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respect for our Constitution.
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134. Professor Slaughter has written eloquently that:
[C]onstitutionalism is an international as well as a domestic value. The
Constitution mandates special safeguards for the conclusion of interna-
tional agreements with direct, significant, and lasting constraints on
U.S. sovereignty. These safeguards cannot be circumvented by semantic
sleight-of-hand. If ... agreements qualify as a treaty, they must be
passed as a treaty. The Senate should give its full attention to that
question, in the best interests of both the domestic and the international
rule of law.
Slaughter Letter, supra note 112, at 8 (emphasis added).
President Harry Truman, had this to say about the treaty process:
Paragraph 2 of Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that: "He (the president) shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur" . . . . If the powers of the President are
further limited . . . the country may as well readopt the Articles of
Confederation ... The men who wrote the Constitution knew history,
were familiar with government as practiced in their day and had be-
come experienced in the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation.
Letter from Harry S. Truman to Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. (March 25, 1955),
reprinted in OFF THE RECORD: THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF HARRY S TRUMAN 314 (Rob-
ert H. Ferrell ed., 1980) (commenting on a proposed constitutional amendment).
See generally supra note 12 (President Truman's views on the Senate's rejection of
the Treaty of Versailles). Incidentally, it was on August 6 of 1945, fifty years ago,
when, in accordance with the orders of President Truman, a bomb using highly en-
riched uranium decimated Hiroshima. A plutonium bomb hit Nagasaki less than 75
hours later. Whether or not dropping the bombs was appropriate, they showed an
unknowing world what boundless horror can be unleashed upon innocent people; the
bombings gave all free nations a chance to face the facts, and to pull back from the
brink.
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